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11 July 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting of Working Group on Strategic Arms Limitation, 10 July 1968

1. Those present included Adrian Fisher (Chairman), Ambassador Bohlen, Spurgeon Keeny, Morton Halperin, General Benjamin Evans (JCS), John Shaw (GPM-State), General John Davis, [REDACTED] and Bruce Clarke. [REDACTED]

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2. Timing: No date or place set for meeting with Soviets. Bohlen expects talks with Soviets will begin late August or early September. Objective now is to have all the substantive and procedural details worked out so that the President can begin to focus on them after his return from the Pacific meeting with Thieu. If there are going to be substantive issues ("mutual second-strike deterrence" versus "superiority") between DoD and ACDA-State, these need to be spelled out to facilitate early resolution by the President. August 15 was agreed as the operating target date to have everything ready in final form for the President. Meanwhile, if impasses turn up these will be taken to the Principals or the President for resolution.

3. New SNIE requested: Halperin requested the intelligence community to prepare a SNIE on what courses of action the Soviets are likely to take in the military field if they enter into limitations agreements like those now proposed in the State-ACDA paper. He said that such projections are needed to assess future US assured destruction and damage limiting capabilities under conditions

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of an agreement. This request was endorsed by Fisher and the other members of the Working Group. The consensus was that the SNIE, to be of maximum use in the preparations now under way, should be ready by 1 August. I told the Working Group I would determine the feasibility of the request, particularly given this time constraint and the fact that we already had another SNIE under forced draft, and report back.

4. As I see the request, the SNIE would provide judgments on two areas of activity open to the Soviets following an agreement:

a. Technical--what are the most likely technical courses of action they would turn to in order to upgrade the quality of the forces left to them under the agreement: MIRVs?, MRVs?, turn Tallinn system into an ABM?, develop a Poseidon-like missile for their SSBs?

b. Forces--what other avenues of development of their military forces would the Soviets be likely to follow--increase strategic bomber strength?, build up capabilities for distant conventional action?, greatly build up and extend ASW capabilities?, etc. Halperin indicated he hoped this would make it possible to draw up NIPP-like quantifications of Soviet forces after an agreement.

5. Basic Position Paper: CIA will prepare a memorandum setting forth proposed update and corrections of Soviet deployment figures contained in the Position Paper.

6. Opening Statement: DoD is redrafting the Statement and hopes to have at least a first cut available for discussion in the Working Group in a week or so. Halperin asked for three or four weeks to get the DoD views organized and coordinated within the Pentagon. Both Keeney and Fisher took strong exception, particularly since the inference is that the DoD Opening Statement may reflect substantive differences which will require resolution at the top.

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7. Verification: Discussion in the Working Group on verification problems was put off until SNIE 11-13-68 is available. Two matters were raised as future problems: some statement for public consumption probably will be necessary to explain the term "national means of verification;" the final agreement with the Soviets probably should have some language calling for continuation of the status quo as regards actions taken (or not taken) against satellite reconnaissance and providing, in effect, that any detected efforts to conceal or deceive would be considered grounds for withdrawal from the entire agreement.

8. USAF Minuteman III test: Ambassador Bohlen pointed out that he understood the Air Force was about to launch the first US test of a MIRVed warhead to the accompaniment of much public fanfare. He thought this would be ill-timed if it were to come just before or during the initial talks with the Soviets and asked the DoD representatives to look into the matter with a view toward postponement.

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